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Abstract

In Thornton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court applied the bright-line rule of New York v.
Belton to uphold the search of containers in the passenger compartment of a car when the arresting officer
made initial contact with the suspect alter the suspect had parked his car and started walking away. Justice
Scalia concurred in the judgment but criticized the majority for relying on the bright-line rule of Belton to
uphold the search, stating that the Court’s effort to apply the Belton rule stretched that doctrine "beyond its
breaking point."
Justice Scalia found the search in Thornton lawful by applying a more general reasonableness test. He stated
he would "limit Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle." Virtually every commentator who has written on Thornton has
characterized Justice Scalia’s approach as “more honest" and "built on firmer ground" than Belton but
nevertheless, has rejected the approach, typically over a concern that it authorizes a search of an automobile
on less than probable cause.
This article argues that Justice Scalia’s approach in Thornton should be embraced by commentators who seek
greater protection for citizens as they travel the streets and highways in their vehicles. It explores the potential
for applying the reasonableness test as envisioned by Justice Scalia to limit the various bright-line rules the
Court has authorized over the years. Among other advantages, such an approach would limit racial profiling
and other pretextual searches, thereby providing citizens protection from one of the greatest current threats to
individual liberties.
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Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing
Justice Scalia's Call for the Supreme Court To
Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to
Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law
Edwin J.Butterfoss*
n Thornton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court applied the bight-line
rile of New York v. Belton to uphold the search ofcontainersin thepassengercompartment of
a car when the arrestingofficer made initialcontact with the suspect alter the suspect hadparked
his carand started walking away Justice Scalia concurred in thejudgment but criticized the
majority for relying on the bright-line rule of Belton to uphold the search, stating that the
Courtseffort to apply the Belton rule stretchedthat doctrine "beyondits breakingpoint."
Justice Scalia found the search in Thornton lawful by applying a more general
reasonablenesstest. He stated he would "himitBelton searches to cases where it isreasonableto
believe evidence relevant to the crime ofarrestmight be found in the vehicle." Virtually every
commentator who has written on Thornton has characterizedJusticeScalia f approachas 'nore
honest" and "builton frmerground"than Belton but nevertheless,has rejected the approach,
typically overa concern thatit authorizesa searchofan automobile on less thanprobablecause.
This Article argues that Justice Scaliak approach in Thornton should be embraced by
commentators who seek greaterprotectionfor citizens as they travel the streets andhighways in
their vehicles. It explores the potential for applying the reasonablenesstest as envisioned by
Justice Scalia to limit the various bnght-line rules the Court has authorized over the years.
Among other advantages,such an approach would limit racial profilng and other pretextual
searches, thereby providing citizens protection from one of the greatest current threats to
indidualliberties.
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The issue of whether searches and seizures by the police should
be governed by a per se rule based on the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment or a more general rule of reasonableness based on the
Reasonableness Clause of that Amendment has plagued the United
States Supreme Court for decades.' At least in theory, the warrant
approach, which generally requires the police, whenever practicable, to
obtain a warrant prior to undertaking a search, prevailed in the contest
between the two approaches The Court frequently declares that "[i]t
remains a 'cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' 3 However,
the Court has also declared that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness," and decides certain types of search
and seizure cases by determining whether the government conduct is
reasonable without regard to whether it was possible for the police to
obtain a warrant.4 The frequency with which the Court has utilized this
1.
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(describing the Court's jurisprudence as "lurch[ing] back and forth" between the two
approaches and advocating adoption of the reasonableness approach).
2.
See, e.g., id at 580 (majority opinion) (recognizing that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 n.4 (1990) (reaffirming the
"cardinal principle" of the warrant requirement).
3.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
4.
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2201 n.4 (2006); United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); see also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947
(2006) (noting reasonableness as the "ultimate touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment); Bd.
of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (reviewing the school
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reasonableness approach has led commentators to conclude that the
Court has abandoned the per se warrant approach in favor of the
reasonableness approach
A second fundamental debate that plagues the Court is whether
Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases should be decided on a
case-by-case method of adjudication or by the application of brightline rules.' Similar to its inconsistent jurisprudence in the per se
warrant versus reasonableness debate, despite stating a strong
preference for case-by-case adjudication in some areas of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence,' in other areas the Court has expressed a
preference for bright-line rules.8 In these latter areas, the Court has
pointed to the administrative need for easily applied rules to justify
creating bright-line rules to uphold searches under established
exceptions even when the original justifications for the exceptions are
not present in the particular case before the Court.9

district's drug-testing policy for reasonableness as the foundation of Fourth Amendment
analysis); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (noting that the "touchstone" of a
Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness).
5.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 1097, 1107 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Terry & FirstPrinciples] (noting that
since Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court has often read the Fourth Amendment as
emphasizing reasonableness rather than warrants and probable cause as the Amendment's
central command); Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPinciples, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles](noting that the Supreme Court does not
really support the strict warrant approach); Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and
the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line
Rules, 74 Miss. L.J. 341, 355-56 (2004) (arguing this shift is the result of the Court's search
for determinacy and clarity in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence at the expense, in
Professor Dripps' view, of legitimacy); William W Greenhalgh & Mark . Yost, In Defense of
the "'Perse" Rule: Justice Stewart s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendent s Warrant
Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1096-98 (1994) (noting that the per se rule requiring
warrants has not been expressly overruled and may be dormant).
See Albert W Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment 45 U.
6.
PiTT. L. REv. 227, 227-31 (1984) (discussing the merits and consequences of bright-line
rules); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World- On Dmwing
"'BightLines" and "Good Faith",43 U. PITr. L. REv. 307, 320-33 (1982) (discussing both the
desirability and impracticability of bright-line rules); David M. Silk, Comment, When Bright
Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v. Belton, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 281, 281-82 (1987)
(providing an overview of the two approaches of the Court).
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) ("[W]e have consistently eschewed
7.
bright line rules....").
8.
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("[O]ur more
fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there
must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons
supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.").
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) ("In short, '[a] single
9.
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
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Perhaps no group of cases better illustrates both the Court's
struggle with the per se warrant approach versus the reasonableness
approach and the bright-line rule versus case-by-case adjudication
debate than those involving the search incident to arrest exception.
The checkered history of the exception prior to Climel v Califomid'
resulted largely from the Court shifting from the per se approach to the
reasonableness approach and back again (and again)." Following the
Court's adoption of a narrow search incident exception applying the
per se warrant approach in Chimel, the controversy turned to the
application of the exception in various settings, particularly the
permissible scope of the search incident to arrest of occupants of
vehicles.'2 The Court resolved that issue in favor of a bright-line rule
in New York v Belton, permitting the search of the passenger
compartment and all containers in the passenger compartment
regardless of the crime for which the occupant had been arrested or the
likelihood that the arrestee could gain access to the car or containers. 3
At least one commentator appears to place the blame for this brightline rule at the feet of the reasonableness approach. ' But in a
concurring opinion in a recent case involving the search incident to
arrest exception in situations involving vehicles, Justice Scalia
suggested the bright-line rule in this area failed to pass constitutional
muster under the reasonableness approach." He proposed limiting
searches of automobiles following the arrest of recent occupants to
instances where the officers have facts making it "reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle."' 6
Commentators favoring greater Fourth Amendment protection
for citizens have resisted Justice Scalia's approach because it
apparently would permit searches of automobiles and containers
within the automobiles on suspicion less than probable cause.'7 This
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront."' (citation omitted)).
10.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11.
For a detailed account of this history, see George Dery & Michael J. Hernandez,
Turning a Government Search into a PermanentPower: Thornton v. United States and the
'ProgressiveDistortion"ofSearch Incident To Arrest, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 677, 68187 (2005).
12.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-59.
13. Id.at 560.
14.
See Dripps, supra note 5,at 377-78.
15. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627-29 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. Id.at 632.
17.
See inraPart III.
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concern with requiring probable cause to justify searches stems from
an allegiance to the Warrant Clause.'8 But a reinvigorated warrant
requirement is an unlikely route to greater protection of citizens'
Fourth Amendment rights. As Justice Scalia has observed concerning
the "victory" of the per se warrant approach over the reasonableness
approach, "The victory was illusory. Even before today's decision, the
'warrant requirement' had become so riddled with exceptions that it
was basically unrecognizable."' 9 The real danger today to citizens'
rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is not that a
search of their cars following their arrest will be permitted on
suspicion less than probable cause, but rather that a search of their cars
unrelated to the reason for the arrest will occur without any level of
suspicion whatsoever." This is especially true because the Court's
decisions in cases involving pretext and arrests for minor offenses have
made citizens particularly vulnerable to being arrested whenever they
engage in the common activity of operating a motor vehicle.'
Justice Scalia's opinion in Thornton v United States is
particularly intriguing because he suggests an approach that would
result in greater protections for citizens by addressing arbitrary,
suspicionless searches resulting from pretextual traffic stops and
arrests, and, most importantly, may appeal to a conservative majority
of the Roberts Court." This Article argues that it is time to abandon
the quest to persuade the Court to embrace and vigorously enforce the
per se warrant approach in deciding Fourth Amendment search and
seizure cases. Instead, those seeking expanded protection for citizens
should embrace the reasonableness approach suggested by Justice
Scalia in Thornton as a means of advocating for greater protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures, hastening the demise of
bright-line rules, and restoring the personal security of individuals in
their vehicles. Part II of the Article examines the various opinions in
Thornton, paying particular attention to Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion calling for a revamping of the bright-line rules governing
searches incident to arrest of occupants of vehicles. Part III examines
See Amar, Terry & First Principles, supra note 5, at 1111 (explaining the
18.
"warrantist" argument that because a warrant without probable cause is plainly unreasonable,

warrantless searches without probable cause are likewise unconstitutional).
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
19.
20.
See Dripps, supra note 5, at 394-98.
21.
Professor Dripps labels this cumulative effect of New York v Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981 ), Whren v United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and A twater v City ofLago Vista
532 U.S. 318 (2001), as the "Iron Triangle." Dripps, supra note 5, at 392-93.
22.
541 U.S. 615, 625-33 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the commentary on Thornton that resists adoption of Justice Scalia's
approach, arguing that this resistance is based on an overly optimistic
allegiance to the Warrant Clause. Part IV examines Justice Scalia's
proposed approach in detail, demonstrating that commentators
rejecting Justice Scalia's approach are missing the opportunity to
champion an approach that should hold appeal for a conservative
majority of the Court, would reestablish the constitutional moorings of
the search incident to arrest exception in situations involving vehicles,
and would address one of the significant Fourth Amendment issues of
our time: arbitrary, suspicionless searches resulting from pretextual
traffic stops and arrests.
HI.

THORNTON V UNITED STATES

A.

Facts

When Marcus Thornton slowed down to avoid driving next to
Officer Deion Nichols, a uniformed officer on patrol in an unmarked
car, the officer's suspicions were aroused.23 After pulling onto a side
street to let Thornton pass him, Officer Nichols ran a license plate
check and discovered that the license tags had been issued to a
different make and model car than the one Thornton was driving.24
Before Nichols had an opportunity to pull him over, Thornton drove
into a parking lot and parked his car.25 As Officer Nichols pulled in
behind Thornton, he saw Thornton exit his vehicle.26 Officer Nichols
parked his patrol car, accosted Thornton, and asked for his driver's
license. He informed Thornton that his license tags did not match the
make and model of the car he was driving.28
Based on Thornton's nervous behavior, Officer Nichols asked
Thornton if he had any narcotics or weapons on him or in his car, to
which Thornton replied he did not.29 Thornton then agreed to a pat
down, in the course of which Officer Nichols felt a bulge in Thornton's
left front pocket." Officer Nichols again asked if Thornton was
carrying any illegal drugs.' Thornton admitted that he was and pulled
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.
Id.at 618.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(describing that Thornton began rambling, licking his lips, and sweating).
Id.
Id.
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two bags from his pocket, one containing three bags of marijuana and
the other a large amount of crack cocaine.32 Officer Nichols
handcuffed Thornton, informed him he was under arrest, and placed
him in the back seat of his patrol car.33 He searched Thornton's vehicle
and discovered a handgun under the driver's seat. 4
Thornton was convicted of various crimes, including two based
on his possession of the handgun." He appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress the handgun, arguing that the search incident to
arrest permitted under New York v Belton "was limited to situations
where the officer initiated contact with an arrestee while he was still an
occupant of the car." 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit denied his appeal, holding that the historical rationales
supporting the search incident to arrest doctrine did not require Belton
to be so limited.37 The Fourth Circuit pointed to the fact that Thornton
was in "close proximity, both temporally and spatially,' to his vehicle
to support its finding that the car was within Thornton's immediate
control and the search was therefore lawful under Belton.38
B.

MajorityandDissentingOpinibnsin the UnitedStates Supreme
Court

The majority and dissenting opinions both attempted to apply,
rather than reexamine, the rule of Belton. Chief Justice Rehnquist's'
opinion for the Court was a relatively short, straightforward
application and clarification of Belton.39 Taking the rule of Belton as a
given, the Chief Justice quickly rejected Thornton's attempt to
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.at 619. Thornton was charged with "possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base, possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime." Id.at 618 (citations omitted). A jury convicted
Thornton on all three counts. Id.
at 619.
36.
Id
37.
Id.The Fourth Circuit identified these as "'the need to disarm the suspect in
order to take him into custody' and 'the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial."'
United States v. Thornton, 325 F3d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113, 116 (1998)), affg 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
38.
Id.
at 196.
39.
See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 619-24. The Chief Justice viewed the case before the
Court as the "wrong case" to reexamine the bright-line rule of Belton along the lines
suggested by Justice Scalia because the question was not raised by the petition for certiorari
and the government had not had an opportunity to address the issue. Id.
at 624 n.4; see also
Dery & Hernandez, supra note 11, at 693 (describing Justice Rehnquist's opinion as
approaching Thornton"as a case determining the limits of Belton").
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distinguish his case based on the fact that the officer first made contact
with him after he exited his vehicle, finding that fact unpersuasive in
distinguishing Thornton's case "as it bears no logical relationship to
Belton's rationale."' Justice Rehnquist noted that in setting forth the
rule to govern the scope of a search of an automobile incident to arrest,
the Court in Belton "placed no reliance on the fact that the officer...
ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, or initiated contact with them
while they remained within it.'"4'
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist candidly conceded that "[i]t is
unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached under the
driver's seat for his gun once he was outside of his automobile," he
considered it unimportant that not all contraband in the passenger
compartment is likely to be readily accessible to a suspect initially
accosted outside his vehicle. "2 Important to Chief Justice Rehnquist
was "[t]he need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers
and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were
not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment." 3 The fact
that the clear rule in this case was to some extent loosed from its
moorings in that it did not depend on the likelihood that the area
searched was one from which the suspect could obtain a weapon or
conceal or destroy evidence-the underlying justifications for the
search incident exception-was less important to Justice Rehnquist
than preserving the clarity of the Belton rule.' Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the "contact initiation" rule proposed by Thornton
would obfuscate rather than clarify the limits of Belton.45 That
conclusion doomed Thornton's case because, as Justice Rehnquist
explained in the footnote that ended his opinion, a reevaluation of the
Belton rule was not before the Court."
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Souter,
took precisely the opposite view of the case. 7 He agreed with Justice
Rehnquist that the basic rationale of Belton for permitting a search of
the passenger compartment and all containers was "an overriding
desire to hew 'to a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably

40.
41.

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620.
Id

42.

Id.
at 622.

43.
44.

Id. at 622-23.
Id.at 623-24.

45.
46.

1d.at 623.
Id.
at 624 n.4.

47.

dissenting).
Id.at 636 (Stevens, J.,
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enforced."" 8 However, he was of the opinion that the Court's extension
of the Belton rule to pedestrians who are 'the sort of "recent
occupant" of a vehicle such as [Thornton] was here'
was
unnecessary and itself obfuscated the Belton rule." Justice Stevens
believed that in cases in which the arrestee is first accosted when he is
a pedestrian, the Chimel rule applied and provided clear guidance."
He agreed with Justice Scalia that the only genuine justification for
extending Belton to such cases was the interest in uncovering
potentially valuable evidence.'
Unlike Justice Scalia, he did not
believe that interest justified a search and expressed concern that the
decision would contribute to "'a massive broadening of the automobile
exception' when officers52have probable cause to arrest an individual
but not to search his car.
C

The Concumng Opinions

The concurring opinions in Thornton called for a reexamination
of the Belton rule." Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's
opinion, but wrote separately to express her dissatisfaction with the
state of the law relating to searches of vehicles incident to arrest. She
expressed concern that "lower court decisions seem now to treat the
ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as
a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin
rationales of Chimel v California."" She believed that this was a
"direct consequence of Belton's shaky foundation," and that Justice
Scalia's approach appeared to be "built on firmer ground."56 She
declined to join Justice Scalia's opinion, however, because "neither the
Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit."57

48.
49.

Id.at 634 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981)).
Id.at 636 (quoting id.at 623-24 (majority opinion)).

50.
51.

Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id.; id.
at 632 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

52.

Id.at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,

452 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted).
53.
Id.
at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id.
at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54.
Id.at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concurred in all but
the final footnote of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in which he expressed his view that the case

was the wrong case to reexamine Belton because the issue was not raised by the petition for
certiorari nor considered by the court of appeals and reaching the issue would potentially
involve overruling established precedent. Id.
at 624.
55. Id.at 624.
56. Id.at 624-25.
57. Id.at 625.
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Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg,
concurred only in the judgment." He felt the majority's application of
the search incident to arrest doctrine to the search of Thornton's car
stretched the doctrine "beyond its breaking point."'" His concern was
not simply the extension of the bright-line Belton rule to situations in
which officers initiate contact with suspects after the suspect has left
his vehicle.' Justice Scalia questioned the propriety of upholding all
searches of vehicles under the rule and rationale of Belton in situations
where, at the time of the search, the suspect had no realistic chance of
accessing the car because he had been handcuffed or even removed
from the scene.6" Because the Court always held such searches lawful
under Belton if the initial contact with the suspect occurred when the
suspect was in his vehicle, Justice Scalia's opinion called for a
reassessment of the Belton rule.
Justice Scalia could see no reason why searches in cases where
the arrestee was handcuffed and moved away from the vehicle could
be justified under the twin rationales of the search incident exception:
officer safety and destruction of evidence. 63 First, he was unpersuaded
that such a search could be justified by any danger that the suspect
could escape his confinement and retrieve a weapon or evidence from
his vehicle.' Not only did such a scenario require an arrestee
"'possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules,"' it
was not borne out by the historical evidence put forth by the
government."

Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58.
59.
Id.
60. See id. at 626-27.
61.
Id.
62.
See id.at 628-29.
Id.at 625-27.
63.
64. Id.at 625-26.
Id at 626 (quoting United States v. Frick, 490 E2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973)
65.
(Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Scalia explained the
evidence put forward by the government:
The United States, endeavoring to ground this seemingly speculative fear in reality,
points to a total of seven instances over the past 13 years in which state or federal
officers were attacked with weapons by handcuffed or formerly handcuffed
arrestees. These instances do not, however, justify the search authority claimed.
Three involved arrestees who retrieved weapons concealed on their own person.
Three more involved arrestees who seized a weapon Aom the arresting officer
Authority to search the arrestee's own person is beyond question; and of course no
search could prevent seizure of the officer's gun. Only one of the seven instances
involved a handcuffed arrestee who escaped from a squad car to retrieve a weapon
from somewhere else: In [one case], the suspect jumped out of the squad car and
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Second, Justice Scalia rejected the notion that because the
officers could have searched the vehicle had the suspect remained in or
near the car, the officers "should not be penalized for having taken the
sensible precaution of securing the suspect in the squad car first."6
Many courts had accepted this rationale and reasoned that denying the
officer the right to search if she took the precaution of securing the
suspect would be to require the search to take place in a manner
"'entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures."''
In
Justice Scalia's view, "The weakness of this argument is that it assumes
that, one way or another, the search must take place. But conducting a
Chirnel search is not the Government's right; it is an exceptionjustified by necessity-to a rule that would otherwise render the search
unlawful." 8 Justice Scalia asserted:
If "sensible police procedures" require that suspects be handcuffed and
put in squad cars, then police should handcuff suspects, put them in
squad cars, and not conduct the search. Indeed, if an officer leaves a
suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to search, one
could argue that the search is unreasonable precisely because the
dangerous conditions justifying it existed only by virtue of the officer's
69
failure to follow sensible procedures.
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that in Belton
searches, the benefits of a bright-line rule justify upholding searches
that, on their particular facts, do not trigger the underlying concerns
ran through a forest to a house, where (still in handcuffs) he struck an officer on
the wrist with a fireplace poker before ultimately being shot dead.
Id.at 626 (citations omitted).
66. Id.at 627. Justice Scalia's rejection of the "now or earlier" rationale that the
Court had used in determining the parameters of searches under several exceptions is a
significant change in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that seems to have gone
unnoticed or unappreciated by commentators analyzing Thornton. See Edwin Butterfoss, As
Time Goes By: The Elimination of Contemporaneityand Brevity as Factorsin Search and
Seizure Cases, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 603, 618-20, 633-34 (1986) (discussing the
development of the "now or earlier" rationale in the context of the search incident to arrest
and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement).
67.
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J.,concurring) (quoting United States v.
Mitchell, 82 E3d 146, 152 (7th Cir. 1996)).
68. Id.Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, expressed the same concern:
I write separately to express my dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this area.
As JUSTICE SCALIA forcefully argues, lower court decisions seem now to treat the
ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police
entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel v
California.
Id.
at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
69. Id.at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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giving rise to the rule. ° Although bright-line rules by definition will
be over-inclusive to some extent, in Justice Scalia's view, tolerating
such over-inclusiveness depends on the strength of the generality on
which the rule is based." Thus, in the context of a search of an
automobile incident to arrest, the validity of the argument that some
degree of over-inclusiveness was justified "rests on the accuracy of
Belton's claim that the passenger compartment is 'in fact generally,72
even if not inevitably,' within the suspect's immediate control.

Justice Scalia believed that experience demonstrated just the
opposite." In his view, the government's admission that "'[t]he
practice of restraining an arrestee on the scene before searching a car
that he just occupied is so prevalent that holding that Belton does not74
..
apply in that setting would ... "largely render Belton a dead letter'

demonstrated that it simply was no longer true that "the passenger
compartment is 'in fact generally, even if not inevitably,' within the
suspect's immediate control.7 5 He expressed complete agreement with
a lower court judge's characterization of the current state of the law:
"[I]n our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our constitutional
moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of purely
exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite
objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a
car to see what they might find."76
Justice Scalia's solution was to recognize the truth that Belton
searches could not be justified on the basis that an arrestee might grab
a weapon or evidentiary item from his car. In Justice Scalia's view,
such searches could only be justified by the need to gather evidence
that might be in the car. 8 He argued that this more "general sort of
evidence-gathering search" was not unprecedented and proposed
limiting Belton searches to cases "where it is reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the

70. Id. at 627-28.
71.
See id. at 627-29.
72. Id. at 627 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981)).
73. Id. at 628.
74. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 36-37, Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615 (2004) (No. 03-5165) (quoting United States v. Wesley, 293 E3d 541, 548 (D.C. Cir.
2002))).
75. Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
76. Id. at 628-29 (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 170 E3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.
1999) (Trott, J., concurring)).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 629.
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vehicle."79 In the case before the Court, Justice Scalia voted to uphold
the search because Thornton had been lawfully arrested for a drug
offense, and it was reasonable to believe that additional contraband or
similar evidence related to the offense for which he was arrested might
be found in the vehicle he had recently exited and which was still
nearby.80
IlI.

RESISTING REASONABLENESS

The commentary following Thornton was predictable. Many
commentators decried the expansion of the Belton bright-line rule as
unwarranted and ill-advised, but expressed hope that because five
justices expressed some level of dissatisfaction with the Belton rule,
the rule might be reexamined soon.8 ' When the commentators
weighed in on what rule should emerge from that hoped-for
reexamination, many credited Justice Scalia's rationale and proposed
' but none
rule as being more honest and "built on firmer ground,"82
advocated that the Court should adopt his approach. 3 Their hesitancy
stemmed largely from resistance to the reasonableness approach and a
concern with protecting the Warrant Clause approach to Fourth

at 629, 632.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary)Placementof Bight Lines: Belton
and Its Progeny, 79 TUL. L. RE. 365, 394-95 (2004); David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux:
Reevaluating Belton , Per se Rule Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident to an
Arrest 40 WAKE FOREST L. RE. 1287, 1287-88 (2005). Litigants have sought such a
reexamination on at least two occasions. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Hrasky v.
United States, 127 S.Ct. 2098 (2007) (No. 06-827) [hereinafter HraskyPetition]; Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 3, Rainey v. Kentucky, 127 S.Ct. 1005 (2007) (No. 06-720). The Hhasky
petition went so far as to argue that it was a better case than Rainey for the hoped for
reexamination of Belton. Hasky Petition, supra, at 24 n.6. Following the denial of the
petition for certiorari in Rainey, 127 S.Ct. at 1005, the petitioner sought reconsideration and
asked that the case be consolidated with Hrasky,but that request was also denied. Petition for
Rehearing from Denial of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rainey v. Kentucky, 127 S.Ct.
1395 (2007) (No. 06-720). Shortly thereafter, the Hrasky petition was also denied. Hrasky,
127 S.Ct. at 2098.
82.
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1343 (noting that while Justice Scalia's rule
has advantages over a per se rule, it suffers from two major flaws). Some even recognized the
benefits of Justice Scalia's approach in terms of limiting arbitrary, suspicionless, and
pretextual searches, but remained unpersuaded that it should be adopted. Id; see also Dripps,
supra note 5, at 404 (recognizing Justice Scalia's approach as a welcome attack on the "Iron
Triangle," but discussing "two problematic aspects" that suggest it should not be adopted);
Lunney, supra note 81, at 398-99 (recognizing Justice Scalia's approach would offer
improvements over the majority approach, but expressing significant concerns and confusion
over his approach).
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Amendment search and seizure cases." That led them to advocate an
approach that would permit warrantless searches only as part of
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions based on
concerns that made obtaining a warrant impracticable, which, in turn,
required focusing on the concerns justifying the search incident
exception and trying to keep the exceptions as "jealously and carefully
drawn ' ' 85 as possible.86 They generally advocated for a rejection of the
bright-line rule of Belton and a return to applying the "wingspan" rule
of Chimel on a case-by-case basis in all search incident caseswhether the arrest took place in the home, on the street, or in a
vehicle 7 -- or for limiting Belton searches either in the manner
advocated by the defendant in Thornton8 or to the passenger
compartment only, not containers within the vehicle or passenger
compartment.Y
Many commentators cling to a belief that the only way to provide
protection to citizens from arbitrary searches is to apply the Warrant
Clause more strictly to require a warrant, or at least probable cause, to
justify most searches.98 They fear that a reasonableness approach is
essentially standardless and would authorize arbitrary searches." That
concern was expressed very early by Justice Frankfurter in United
States v RabinowitO
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of
reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the
police to say that an "unreasonable search" is forbidden-that the
search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason which makes a
search reasonable? The test is the reason underlying and expressed by
the Fourth Amendment: the history and the experience which it
84.
See Amar, Terry & First Principles,supra note 5, at 1106 (explaining that for
many lawyers, scholars, and judges the notion that the Fourth Amendment requires only a
reasonableness analysis is "nothing less than scandalous" because "they assume that the
reasonableness clause cannot be understood in isolation-it gains its true meaning only when
read alongside the warrant clause").
85. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,499 (1958).
86. See, e.g., Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 5, at 10 16-17 (advancing the view that a
warrant must be impractical or unreasonable to justify a warrantless search).
87.
See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1350-60 (listing the numerous advantages of
the immediate control rule adopted in Chimel,among other possible approaches).
88.
See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 11, at 700-01 (advocating for limiting Belton
to searches involving occupants of cars and applying the Chimel rule in situations where the
officer met the suspect outside the car).
89. See Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1338 (noting that this is the approach Justices
Stevens and Souter advocated in their dissenting opinion in Thornton).
90. Professor Amar describes these commentators as "warrantists" and, of course, is
one of their greatest critics. See Amar, Terry & FirstPrinciples,supranote 5, at 1106-07.
91.
Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 5, at 1017.
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embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to which it
was a response. There must be a warrant to permit search, barring only
inherent limitations upon that requirement when there is a good excuse
for not getting a search warrant, Le., the justifications that dispense with
search warrants when searching the person in his extension, which is
his body and that which his body can immediately control, and moving
vehicles.92
Adding to that concern is the tendency of the Court to uphold
searches and seizures as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment by
the simple declaration that they are so, possibly permitting unknown
factors to play a role in the analysis.93 But the Court's failure to
undertake the effort does not mean the "criterion of reason" that
Justice Frankfurter insisted upon cannot be found outside the Warrant
Clause.9' The road to increased protection for citizens may be to
advocate for the Court to undertake this task rather than treating it as
impossible or unlikely to provide adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights.
Without entering the continuing historical debate over whether
the language or the intent of the Framers was to impose a per se
warrant approach or a reasonableness approach, perhaps it is time to
accept the influence of reasonableness in the Court's current search
and seizure jurisprudence and advocate for greater safeguards under
that approach, rather than focusing on the per se warrant approach as
the only route to a greater level of protection. Professor Akhil Amar, a
leading advocate for the view that history and the language of the
Amendment demand the reasonableness approach," has identified
some of the advantages of such an approach in gaining additional
security for citizens.9" He points to the Court's approach in Terry v
Ohio-the seminal reasonableness approach case-as a case that did
not simply rely on a label of reasonableness to decide the issues before
97
it but attempted to define why the police conduct was reasonable. He
suggests that the reasonableness approach offers a mechanism to
provide protection for citizens that the per se warrant approach simply

339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
92.
See Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 5, at 1090-93 (explaining the consequences of
93.
the current balancing test, including its inability to provide practical guidance).
Rabinowitz,339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
94.
See Amar, Terry & First P'nciples, supra note 5, at 1098-1099; Amar, First
95.
Principles,supa note 5, at 758.
96. Amar, Terry &FistPrinciples,supra note 5, at 1098-99.
See id.
97.

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 82:77

cannot." He asserts that a reasonableness approach demands proportionality and permits the Court to forthrightly consider not only
privacy and secrecy, but bodily integrity, personal dignity, race, and
police officer discretion, while also being responsive to popular
sentiment." He concludes that Terry "hinted at some of the factors
that bear on reasonableness, but failed to develop a systematic account
of these factors, needlessly leading civil libertarians to worry that
under
a proper reasonableness regime, government would have free
rein.,, 1°°
Perhaps civil libertarians should take up the cause of developing a
search and seizure reasonableness jurisprudence that develops a
systematic account of these factors rather than pressing for the primacy
of the warrant. "Warrantists" are limited to arguing the search is
improper because it is not supported by a warrant or probable causean argument that fails once bright-line rules are justified and
established-rather than being able to attack directly the true evils of
the searches: that they are arbitrary, pretextual, and, possibly, based on
racial profiling. '
Another criticism of the reasonableness approach is that the
approach has led to the development of bright-line rules.' 2 In
discussing the Court's vacillation between the per se warrant approach
and the reasonableness approach, Professor Dripps characterizes
United States v Robinson as a "watershed decision" in the shift "away
from a warrant-clause model and toward a model based on
unconstrained notions of reasonableness." ' °3 He states that the Court in
Robinson "rejected Robinson's claim, and the warrant-clause model
along with it"
concluding that after Robinson, "the need for bright-line
rules was married to the reasonableness model of the Fourth
Amendment.""' He also describes Belton as a "harbinger of the seachange" toward the reasonableness model in which the Court
embraced the need for bright-line rules. 5 But Professor Dripps' view
of bright-line rules being married to the reasonableness model is
debatable. The alignment of the justices in Belton certainly does not

98.
See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
at 1099-1100.
101. Seeid.at 1098, 1106.
102. Dripps, supm note 5, at 364-65.
103. d.at 363.
104. Id.at 364-65.
105. Id.at 376-77.
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suggest that the Court was applying a reasonableness approach.'" The
majority opinion was authored by Justice Stewart, a champion of the
warrant approach;'07 Justice White, the champion of the reasonableness
approach, dissented.' °8 Justice Stewart began his opinion by stating the
classic mantra of the warrant approach, "It is a first principle of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search
unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable
cause to do so."' ' Other commentators have characterized Justice
Stewart's opinion as "focused on preserving the 'per se' rule while also
'
developing clear guidelines for police and judges to apply."" Thus,
the per se warrant approach is just as likely to blame for the creation of
bright-line rules as the reasonableness approach.
Under the warrant approach, the Court, by insisting a warrant is
required whenever practicable, in large measure limits the basis for
forgiving the warrant to temporal exigency: that probable cause exists
but there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant."' The limited
"excuse" available for the absence of a warrant, and the apparent
unavailability of excuses for the lack of probable cause, prevents
2
consideration of the concerns identified by Professor Amar." If
temporal exigency is a primary basis for an exception, the exceptions
created likely will prove either difficult to apply to the myriad
situations that arise or too burdensome to apply strictly. An example is
106. See id. at 377 (detailing the Justices' vote in Beton).
107. See id at 377 (noting that Justice Stewart had long been a "staunch defender of
the warrant requirement"); Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 5, at 1059 (noting Justice Stewart's
support of the warrant requirement).
108. See Dripps, supa note 5, at 377. That the warrant model arguably permitted a
search of the scope at issue in Beton, but the reasonableness model as applied by Justice
White would not have, supports the notion that the warrant approach is not the only place to
look to provide greater protection of citizens' Fourth Amendment rights. See Amar, First
Pn'nciples, supra note 5, at 759 (describing alternate ways to ensure Fourth Amendment
protection including a defined reasonableness standard, the Seventh Amendment, and
twentieth-century "legal weaponry").
109. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981). However, it is also true that
Justice Stewart later quoted language from United States v Robinson emblematic of the
reasonableness model: "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id.at 461 (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
110. E.g., Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 5, at 1079 (citing Belton as an example of
this approach by Justice Stewart); see Dery & Hernandez, supa note 11, at 688-89 (noting
that Belton's focus was a practical implementation of Fourth Amendment principles).
11l. C£ Amar, Terry & First Pn'nciples, supra note 5, at 1099 (describing how
temporal exigency can justify the failure to obtain a warrant when there is probable cause).
112. See id. at 1098-99, 1114-15 (discussing the difficulty of explaining searches on
less than probable cause under the warrant approach).
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the Court's unwillingness to recognize that once an arrestee is confined
in the back of a squad car or removed from the scene there is little
justification for not getting a warrant.' 3 The Court's unwillingness to
require officers to assess whether the exigencies that forgive the
warrant are still present, or to otherwise burden the officers, created
pressure to establish a bright-line rule that does not vary with the
presence or absence of the underlying justifications for the rule."'
That led to the exception becoming "loosed from its moorings" and
searches not justified by the original rational being upheld."5 This
artificiality makes delineating the boundaries of the rule similarly
artificial and makes the rules more difficult, rather than easier, for
officers in the field to understand and follow."6
All this suggests the reasonableness approach, not the per se
warrant approach, may offer the better avenue to greater protection for
113. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625-27 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 816 (1982). The Court stated:
While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even purport to protect
any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new burdens on law enforcement.
Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable-cause
search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious policeman would be
required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the
decision, and finally obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be
detained while the warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the
officer from his normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn
from the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified
when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my view, the
plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate burden of procuring
warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to search the most trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement of
important Fourth Amendment values.
Id.
at 816 n.21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618-20 (upholding search after suspect was
handcuffed, arrested, and placed in the back of the patrol car, thereby nullifying any temporal
exigency). Another example is with searches under the automobile exception. While the
warrant requirement originally was excused based on the mobility of the automobile creating
a temporal exigency, when the Court was faced with situations in which the automobile was
impounded and therefore not mobile, it switched the rationale for excusing the warrant
requirement to the lower expectation of privacy citizens enjoy in their vehicles, a basis not
tied to the practicality of obtaining a warrant. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391
(1985) (noting that the mobility of an automobile is not the only rationale for searches);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (recognizing warrantless searches
of automobiles are allowed because of mobility and a lesser expectation of privacy);
Butterfoss, supra note 66, at 619-20 (noting the Court's recognition that mobility of an
automobile is a tenuous rationale for delayed searches).
116. See Amar, Terry & FirstPnnciples,supr note 5, at 1120 ("'Focusing the inquiry
squarely on the dangers and demands of the particular situation also seems more likely to
produce rules which are intelligible to the police and public alike .
(quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968) (citations omitted))).
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citizens. It seems there is little to lose. Continuing to press for a
solution the Court is unwilling to adopt-a per se warrant approach
with a strong warrant requirement and more narrowly drawn
exceptions that forgive a warrant but not probable cause-has led to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that permits precisely the type of
searches those advocating for the warrant approach abhor most:
completely arbitrary, suspicionless searches. '
In RabinowitZ, Justice Frankfurter asserted that deciding Fourth
Amendment cases based on reasonableness without reference to
probable cause and a warrant "is to make the arrest an incident to an
unwarranted search instead of a warrantless search an incident to an
arrest.""'8 But that is precisely where we find ourselves now. Arrests
for minor offenses are made not for the good of the community or to
effectuate the purpose of the particular law being violated, but to
justify searches of an arrestee that officers seek to undertake in order
to find evidence of crimes for which they harbor no articulable
suspicion."9 The unwillingness of scholars to abandon the warrant
approach, combined with a failure to appreciate fully the possible
benefits of Justice Scalia's new approach, has caused them to give
short shrift to his proposal.'2° In doing so, they have missed a chance
to champion an approach that not only is more honest and "built on
firmer ground"'2 ' than the current rule, but one which would address
the greatest current threat to citizens' Fourth Amendment rightssuspicionless, arbitrary, and pretextual searches. 2' More importantly,

117. See George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafls,and the Framers: James
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOrrpE DAME L. REv.
1451, 1518 (2005) (arguing that to ensure sufficient Fourth Amendment protection the Court
could forego the warrant requirement but should never forego requiring probable cause).
118. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
119. See infra Part WA.
120. See Dripps, supra note 5, at 404 (listing two problems with Justice Scalia's
approach); Lunney, supra note 81, at 397-99 (arguing that Justice Scalia's approach could too
easily expand beyond the realm of the automobile); Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1343-44
(arguing that Justice Scalia's approach is inconsistent and conflicts with Chime.
121. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Dane C. Ball, Thornton v. United States: Bluring Belton f Bight Line Rule
Spells DisasterFor Lower Courts and the FourthAmendmen4 35 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 24 n.203
(2005) (noting that one good feature of Justice Scalia's approach in Thornton is that it could
prevent some pretextual searches); see Thomas, supra note 117, at 1506-07, 1510-11, 1517
(discussing the need for changes in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to address arbitrary,
pretextual stops often based on racial profiling and the need to restore the preeminence of a
requirement of individualized suspicion).
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they are passing on an approach that has a legitimate chance of
appealing to the new, possibly more conservative, Roberts Court. 3
IV

EMBRACING REASONABLENESS AND JUSTICE SCALIA'S APPROACH
IN THORNTON

The first compelling aspect of Justice Scalia's approach is one
that virtually all commentators point to: it is more honest and, in Justice
O'Connor's words, "built on firmer ground."'24 The ground on which
Belton rested was less than firm from the start. On one level, the
decision in Belton was a straightforward application of the Chime/
search incident to arrest exception to the vehicle setting.'25 Chimel
permitted searching the area within the immediate control of the
arrestee, defined as the wingspan or lunging area of an arrestee" 6 If
the arrestee were in a vehicle at the time of arrest, a search of some
portion of the passenger compartment could be justified because it
would be within the arrestee's lunging area. ' But the ground
supporting Belton softened when the Court attempted to justify a
bright-line rule. In addition to relying on the questionable assertion
that lower courts were having difficulty applying the Chime/rule to the
vehicle setting,'28 the Court justified a bright-line rule with the
assertion that the passenger compartment is 'in fact generally, even if
not inevitably,' within the arrestee's immediate control."1 9 That likely
was not true even in Belton because the arresting officer had separated
the four arrestees on the highway before searching the vehicle. Only

123. See Craig M. Bradley, Just One Cheer for the Cour, TRIAL, Aug. 2004, at 62, 64
(suggesting that an approach based on Justice Scalia's opinion might persuade a majority of

the Court).
124. Thornton, 541 U.s. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Ball, supm note
122, at 23 (supporting Justice O'Connor's preference for Justice Scalia's approach); Rudstein,
supra note 81, at 1343 (agreeing that Justice Scalia's approach is more stable than the Court's
bright-line reasoning in Belton).
125. SeeNew York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981) ("Our holding today does
no more than determine the meaning of Chimers principles in this particular and problematic
context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chime] case
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.").
126. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) ("There is ample justification,
therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.").
127. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
128. See LaFave, supm note 6, at 330-33.
129. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at

2007]

BRIGHT LINE BREAKING POINT

the four to one ratio made it plausible that the arrestees could gain
access to the vehicle.
The ground supporting the Belton rule softened further as the
Court applied it in subsequent cases. As Justice Scalia pointed out in
Thornton, if it had ever been true that the passenger compartment was
generally within the immediate control of the arrestee, the factual
scenarios of cases subsequent to Belton demonstrated that the practice
of restraining arrestees prior to searching vehicles, thus placing the
passenger compartment beyond their control, became universal,
supporting the charge that by continuing to uphold such searches,
courts had abandoned the "constitutional moorings" of the search
incident to arrest exception in cases involving vehicles.'30
One rationale utilized by courts to uphold searches carried out
after the arrestee has been restrained (and even removed from the
scene) is that if such searches are declared unlawful, rather than
surrender the power to search, the officer simply will perform the
search before restraining the arrestee.'' Thus, the logic goes, prohibiting such searches provides no additional privacy protection to the
citizen but simply denies police the ability to undertake the search in a
safe and sensible manner.' The Supreme Court had utilized this "now
or earlier" rationale in previous cases to extend the automobile
exception and the search incident to arrest exception.'33 An overlooked
aspect of Justice Scalia's opinion in Thornton is that he directly attacks
the blanket application of this logic under the reasonableness
approach."' He takes issue with the assumption that if a search after
the arrestee has been restrained is prohibited, the officer necessarily
retains the authority to search prior to restraining the arrestee:
If "sensible police procedures" require that suspects be handcuffed and
put in squad cars, then police should handcuff suspects, put them in
squad cars, and not conduct the search. Indeed, if an officer leaves a
suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to search, one
could argue that the search is unreasonable precisely because the

130. Id.at 628-29.
at 627.
13 1. Id.
132. Id.(noting the argument presented in United States v. Mitchell, 82 E3d 146, 152
(7th Cir. 1996) that police should not be penalized for following safe procedures).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (upholding a warrantless, delayed search based on the automobile exception); see also Butterfoss, supra note 66, at
618-20, 625, 633-34 (discussing the emergence and application of the "now or earlier"
rationale in the automobile exception and search incident to arrest exception).
134. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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dangerous conditions justifying it existed only by virtue of the officer's
failure to follow sensible procedures. 35

If Justice Scalia's Thornton approach includes rejecting the "now or
earlier" rationale, or at least requires a more careful application of the
rationale, it is even more reason for those advocating greater protection
of individual rights to champion his position.'36
The most fundamental advantage of Justice Scalia's approach is
his focus on the need to justify searches by articulating a reason to
believe that evidence of a crime will be found in the location to be
searched.' Ironically, this advantage is viewed as a fatal flaw by many
commentators.'38 Because Justice Scalia suggested a "reasonable to
believe" test rather than requiring probable cause, most commentators
abandoned his approach.'39 While the desire to require probable cause
to justify a search is understandable for those focused on a per se
warrant approach, Justice Scalia's approach should not so quickly be
abandoned. As mentioned earlier, the greatest threat to citizens' Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures,
particularly in the context of vehicle searches, is not searches that take
place based on individualized suspicion less than probable cause but
arbitrary searches authorized on no suspicion whatsoever.'4 ° Thus,
Justice Scalia's requirement of suspicion-even suspicion less than
probable cause-is a step forward in the protection of citizens' rights,
135. Id.
136. Rejecting this rationale would result in new limits in searches incident to arrests
in homes where the practice of restraining or removing the arrestee prior to the search is as
prominent as it is in the cases involving vehicles. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of
a Reason: An EmpiicalReexamination of Chimel andBelton, 2002 Wisc. L. REv. 657, 65772 (arguing that because police are generally taught to first handcuff an arrestee, the
assumption that an arrestee has the ability to reach a weapon in his immediate area is
unfounded); see also Butterfoss, supra note 66, at 618-20, 633-34 (noting that this rationale
has played an important role in the expansion of the automobile exception and the search
incident to arrest exception); Dery & Hernandez, supra note 11, at 703-04 (discussing the
Court's expansion of the search incident to arrest exception utilizing this rationale).
137. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1345-47 (lamenting the result of this
approach that would allow a warrantless search on less than probable cause).
139. See id. At least one commentator read Justice Scalia's opinion to equate
"reasonable to believe" with the military's conception of probable cause. See Ernest Harper,
Defending the Citadel of Reasonableness Search and Seizure in 2004, ARMY LAW., Apr.
2005, at 47, 53 (stating Justice Scalia's "reason[] to believe" test "sounds very much like
probable cause, as defined by MRE 315(f)(2)"). Although such a reading would appease
many of the commentators who reject Justice Scalia's approach, it seems unlikely that is what
Justice Scalia intended. If probable cause were present, the automobile exception would
justify the search, eliminating the need for a search incident to arrest rationale. See
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92, 394-95 (1985).
140. See Dripps, supranote 5, at 420-21.
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not a step back. Only a belief that the warrant requirement still
controls and has teeth in these situations would lead to concern over
the fact that the search takes place on less than probable cause.
A.

Relieffrom the "'IronTiangle"

Law review articles frequently bemoan the loss of Fourth
Amendment protection for citizens while driving (or riding in)
automobiles. 4 ' The combined effect of cases upholding pretextual
stops, arrests for minor offenses, and searches under bright-line rules
has been to make citizens subject to arrest and searches virtually at the
unrestrained discretion of the officer in the field.' 2 Professor Dripps
recently baptized this phenomenon the "Iron Triangle":
Belton authorizes [a] thorough search of the person and the passenger
compartment incident to arrest, even though the charge is failure to pay
child support and the search is of a fishing tackle-box. The decision in
Whren v UnitedStates held that police motives for a stop are irrelevant
so long as the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion is
present, even when Vice Squad officers stop a suspected drug dealer for
driving at an unreasonable speed. The last leg in the Iron Triangle is
Atwater, holding that the Fourth Amendment permits the arrest of
persons suspected on probable cause of committing any offense, even a
misdemeanor for which no jail time is authorized and even when there
is no apparent risk of flight or repeated offending.' 3
Professor Dripps explains that because each leg imposes a bright-line
rule, "[t]he Iron Triangle means in practice that the police have general
search power over anyone traveling by automobile."'" He argues that
this practical power of officers to arrest and search any traveler at their
unrestrained discretion is the sort of practice the Framers detested and
offends widely shared contemporary judgments about what police

141. See id; Tracey Maclin, The FourthAmendment on the Freeway,3 RUTGERS RACE
& L. REv. 117, 151-57 (2001); David S. Rudstein, The Search ofan Automobile Incident to
an Arrest. An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 205-06 (1984);
Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 27375 (1989).
142. See Maclin, supra note 141, at 145-46; Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1334-38;
Salken, supra note 141, at 223-25.
143. Dripps, supm note 5, at 392 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id at 393. Professor Dripps is not alone in making this observation. See Maclin,
supra note 141, at 145-46 (noting that because of the myriad of potential traffic violations,
police have incredible power to stop anyone traveling by automobile).
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But like other commentators, while

describing Justice Scalia's opinion as an "admittedly welcome" attack
on the "Iron Triangle," he finds sufficient problems with Justice

Scalia's approach to reject it as the solution to the problem.' 6
Professor Dripps' main concern with Justice Scalia's approach is
that the rule Justice Scalia proposes-that in order to search incident to
arrest the police must have some reason to suspect evidence,

contraband, or weapons-is too vague.'47 He describes it as "a
standard, not a rule, and a fairly vague standard at that.""8 He reads
Justice Scalia's proposal as not requiring probable cause and suggests

that the Court "eventually might equate [Justice Scalia's] standard with
the Terry reasonable-suspicion standard."'4 9 Although he admits that
adopting such a standard "would be helpful from the standpoint of
determinacy because it would give police and lower courts a familiar
toolkit with which to work," he concludes that it would still not provide

sufficient guidance for police and lower courts and identifies "[a]t least
four major uncertainties" that would be created.' ° But several of the
uncertainties that Professor Dripps identifies seem to result from a
reading of Justice Scalia's opinion as calling for rewriting the basic
search incident to arrest exception."' Read in a more limited fashion
as calling for a reevaluation of the Court's utilization of bright-line
rules to expand the exception to situations beyond the underlying

145. Dripps, supra note 5, at 401-04. In his article, Professor Dripps characterizes the
reasonableness approach of the Burger Court as relying on "widely-shared social judgments
of reasonableness" and describes the approach of the Rehnquist Court as based on the "new
historicism" championed by Justice Scalia, relying on "the Founders' views of reasonableness
as reflected in the common law" to determine the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of
contemporary police practices. See id at 394. He concludes that the effect of the decisions
making up the "Iron Triangle" fails "both the test of history and the test of reason," and
therefore, cannot be justified under either the Burger Court or the Rehnquist Court
approaches to reasonableness. Id. at 403-04.
146. Id. at 404 (noting Scalia's approach both adopts common law principles that may
not have been the intent of the Framers and does not create a standard readily applicable by
police); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing cursory treatment of
Justice Scalia's approach).
147. Dripps, supra note 5, at 404. He expresses another concern that the rule may not
be supported by Justice Scalia's desire to decide Fourth Amendment cases by looking to
whether the practice was prohibited at common law. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 404-05.
151. See id at 405-07. Suggesting confusion as to Justice Scalia's rule would seem to
prove Professor Dripps' point about its uncertainties. But a single case, however, could clear
up the basic disagreement as to how it should be read, thus eliminating the struggle Professor
Dripps suggests lower courts would experience applying the rule. See id at 407.
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justifications of Chime, Justice Scalia's approach offers an attractive
escape from the "Iron Triangle."
Professor Dripps' first concern is that a "Terry-type approach"
would require in all search incident to arrest situations "case-by-case
determinations not just about the scope of the suspect's reach (the
Chime1 test) but about the likelihood that any weapons, evidence or
contraband was in fact in the area searched""' This assumes that
Justice Scalia was suggesting imposing his "reason to believe" test on
top of the "wingspan" test of Chimel so that no search incident to
arrest is permitted unless reasonable suspicion exists to believe
contraband or weapons are accessible to the arrestee. But Justice
Scalia likely did not intend to change the rule for a "wingspan" search
incident to arrest-that would remain automatic. He was addressing
searches beyond the wingspan that the Court justified in Belton by

relying not on the rationales that supported the Chine! rule, but with
the need for a bright line to define the limits of the search.'53 He was
concerned with Belton searches, not Chimelsearches generally.'54
It was the Court's application of the bright-line rule of Belton in
the Thornton situation-when the passenger compartment was
indisputably outside the wingspan or lunging area of the suspect-that
in Justice Scalia's view "stretche[d] it beyond its breaking point."'"

And it was that situation for which Justice Scalia suggested a new
rationale. "6 Several times he expressed his concern with Belton

152. Id. at 405.
153. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629-30 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
154. Professor Dripps argues that the common law methodology relied on by Justice
Scalia in deciding Fourth Amendment cases would be influenced by the fact that the common
law did not permit automatic searches incident to arrest but imposed a requirement of
suspicion (not a strict requirement of probable cause) that evidence, weapons, or contraband
might be found during the search. Dripps, supra note 5, at 404. In his analysis of Justice
Scalia's approach, he seems to assume that the common law methodology would be utilized
to reevaluate the Chimelsearch incident to arrest rule. See id. at 405 n.297 ("Justice Scalia's
approach might therefore undermine Chimel as well as Belton."). But though he examined
the historical justification for the Chimelrule, Justice Scalia concluded "both Rabinowitzand
Chimelare plausible accounts of what the Constitution requires, and neither is so persuasive
as to justify departing from settled law." Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Thus it seems fair to evaluate Justice Scalia's approach in Thornton as requiring a new
approach to Belton searches but leaving Chimel searches unaffected.
155. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring). He explained that because
Thornton was nowhere near the passenger compartment at the time his car was searched, but
was handcuffed and secured in the back of a squad car, the risk of him obtaining a weapon or
destroying evidence from the passenger compartment was "remote in the extreme." /d
156. Id. at 631-32.
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searches'57 and concluded by stating, "I would therefore limit Belton
searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."'58 Thus, Justice
Scalia did not intend to limit Chime] searches incident to arrest to
situations where there is some likelihood that weapons, evidence, or
contraband are, in fact, present within the area of immediate control of
the arrestee 9 The rule of Chime1 as described by Professor Dripps
remains unchanged by the approach suggested by Justice Scalia.'"
Professor Dripps' second concern is that "a Teny approach would
have to deal with the suspect's physical capabilities, especially as they
relate to containers.""' He reads Justice Scalia's approach as requiring
an assessment not only of the likelihood that "[a] backpack (or a
briefcase or a toolbox, etc.)" may hold evidence or contraband, but
notes that it would be necessary to determine "how easy.., it [would]
be for the suspect to grab it and destroy it on the facts of a given
case."'62 But again, that is not what Justice Scalia advocates. He is
proposing a rule that permits a "more general sort of evidencegathering search" of areas outside the area to which an arrestee may
gain access.'63 The only assessment required is the likelihood of
evidence or contraband being discovered, not the ability or likelihood
of the suspect gaining access to the area."
157. See id. at 629, 631 (noting his concern by stating "[i]f Belton searches are
justifiable" and "[r]ecasting Belton in these terms").
158. Id. at 632.
159. Seeid.
160. Dripps, supra note 5, at 405 ("Chimeldid not (or at least does not now) require
particularized suspicion of this sort; when the suspect is placed under arrest, the police may
search drawers and closets within the grabbing range without any reason to think that
evidence or a weapon may be there." (footnote omitted)). At least the general rule remains
unchanged. If Justice Scalia's rejection of the "now or earlier" rationale is applied in the
context of search incident to arrests in homes, this "automatic" search may not be permitted
in cases where the suspect is restrained or removed from the scene, a limit not currently
imposed by the Court. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
161. Dripps, supra note 5, at 405.
162. Id.
163. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. See id. The search authorized under Justice Scalia's approach apparently is
geographically limited to the areas of the vehicle where there is reason to believe evidence
exists; he did not suggest the officers could search anywhere they had reason to believe they
would find evidence. In situations not involving a vehicle, some limit will have to be placed
on the geographic scope of the permissible search, but that limit is likely to be defimed by
returning to a pre-Chielnotion of "immediate control," delineated by something other than
wingspan or lunging area. See id. at 629 n.1 (referring to the use of the term "immediate
control," United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950), as used "in a broader sense
than the one it acquired in Cimel"). Even in the case of a vehicle, how recently the suspect
was in control of the car, or how nearby the car is at the time of arrest would be relevant to a
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Professor Dripps' third concern is that "the test would have to
account for what the police might have done differently."'65 He sets out
the classic "now or earlier" rationale that has led to the expansion of
searches under various exceptions:
If the police learn that they lose the search power once the suspect is
handcuffed or locked in the squad car, they may search the suspect
(perhaps at gunpoint for security purposes-hardly an ideal arrangement) while the suspect is still in the car or just outside. Does the Terry
approach66require them to curtail their search authority by restraining the
suspect?

The short answer is that under Justice Scalia's approach, the authority
of the officer does not change when the suspect is restrained. In some
situations, however, the police will not have the authority to search
prior to or after restraining the suspect.
Under Justice Scalia's proposed rule, the authority to search the
suspect is unaffected by his location-the police are entitled to search
the suspect before taking him into custody and can do so after
removing him from his car.'67 A search of the car for evidence is
similarly unaffected by the location of the suspect.'68 If it is reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in
the car, the officers may search even after the suspect is removed-that
is precisely the point of Justice Scalia's approach. He justifies the
search more forthrightly by relying on an evidence-gathering rationale
rather than a strained rationale of officer safety or destruction of
evidence that cannot support a search if the arrestee is restrained or
removed from the scene.'69 Conversely, if the officers are interested in
evidence of a crime unrelated to the offense for which the suspect is
arrested, they are out of luck regardless of the location of the suspect.
That is the advantage of Justice Scalia's approach: it removes the
incentive for pretextual arrests in order to gain the right to search.
As for conducting a "Chimel' search-including portions of the
car-while the suspect is still in the car, the officers may again be out
of luck. As mentioned earlier, a collateral benefit of Justice Scalia's
approach is his rejection of the "now or earlier" rationale and his
conclusion that it was reasonable to believe evidence would be found in the vehicle. See id.
at 630 ("[lIt is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found
where the suspect was apprehended.").
165. Dripps, supra note 5, at 406.
166. Id.(footnote omitted).
167. See Thornton,541 U.S. at 626 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. See id.at 632.
169. Id at 629.
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calling into question the validity not only of a search after the suspect
has been removed from the car but also an earlier search when the
suspect is still in the car.' 7' As Professor Dripps recognizes, it seems
dangerous and not sensible to conduct the search of the suspect and
portions of the car while the suspect remains in the car.'7' Justice
Scalia dealt with this issue directly. He explained that "[i]f 'sensible
police procedures' require that suspects be handcuffed and put in
squad cars, then police should handcuff suspects, put them in squad
cars, and not conduct the search.' 7 2 He went on to assert that "if an
officer leaves a suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture
authority to search, one could argue that the search is unreasonable
only by
preciselybecausethe dangerous conditions justifying it existed
73
virtue of the officer's failure to follow sensible procedures.'
Finally, Professor Dripps laments that Justice Scalia's approach
"would have to be squared with Ross and Acevedo.""'7 He recognizes
that Justice Scalia's suspicion-based approach would curtail searches
incident to arrests for traffic violations, but worries that in the
"common case of an arrest for possession of drugs, perceived by the
officer during the process of writing a traffic citation," the new
approach gives the power to search for suspected contraband without
probable cause, a power the officer would not have under Ross and
Acevedo.1 5 But this power gain will occur in very few situations. If
the officer has perceived "during the process of writing a traffic
citation" facts that provide the officer with the authority to arrest for
drug possession, those facts must amount to probable cause. 7 ' If the
officer has probable cause that the car or a particular container in the
car harbors drugs, Ross and Acevedo are preserved and permit the
search. If the probable cause is so specific to the person and not the
car such that it is not reasonable to believe drugs will be found in the
car, Justice Scalia's approach (unlike current law) will not permit the
7
The only scenario in which the officer will have gained a
search.'1

170. Supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
171. Dripps, supra note 5, at 406.
172. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. Dripps, supra note 5, at 406.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J.,concurring). It seems unlikely this
would occur in light of the Court's decision in Wyoming v Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).

In Houghton, based on the officer's observation of a syringe in the pocket of a driver stopped
for a traffic violation and the driver's candid admission that he used the syringe to take drugs,
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power to search that does not exist under Ross and Acevedo is if the

officer perceives facts that support probable cause that the traffic
violator possesses drugs on his person, and these facts make it
reasonable to believe that drugs may be found in the car (authorizing a
search under Justice Scalia's rule), but do not amount to probable
cause to believe drugs are in the car or containers in the car (which
would authorize a search under Ross and Acevedo). That scenario is
unlikely to occur very frequently.' Thus, the ability of police officers
to use the "search-incident power to circumvent the probable cause
required for a warrantless search under the automobile exception" that
Professor Dripps laments seems extremely limited under Justice
Scalia's approach.' 9
Even if Professor Dripps' power gain situation exists to a greater
extent than suggested here, Justice Scalia's approach to this situation is

still a vast improvement over existing law. Currently, if the officer has
probable cause to arrest for only a traffic violation--or, to use
Professor Dripps example, failure to pay child support-the passenger
compartment of the car, including all containers, can be searched to

find drugs.' ° Under Justice Scalia's approach, the officer needs both
probable cause to arrest for a drug offense and facts making it
"reasonable to believe" that drugs will be found in the car.'8 ' The new
approach eliminates one leg of the "Iron Triangle"--the bright-line
rule of Belton-and puts a significant dent in the other legs. Arrests

the Court found a search of the vehicle and the passenger's purse authorized under the
automobile exception. Id. at 298, 302.
178. Moreover, for such a scenario to occur and result in suppression of evidence, one
has to believe a judge who perhaps subjectively believed that there was only "reason to
believe evidence" would be found in the car would be willing to suppress evidence rather
than making the small leap to deciding that a finding of probable cause was justified. See
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 248-49 ("Similarly, the Supreme Court's insistence that probable
cause is a 'single familiar standard' cannot make the essentially undefined constitutional
language a unitary, bright line concept. Proclaiming that 'the term "probable cause" rings a
bell of certainty,' as Justice Douglas did in a dissenting opinion in Terry v Ohio, is unlikely to
lead any judge to condemn as unreasonable a search that the judge considers reasonable."
(footnote omitted)). But see Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1348-50 (hypothesizing a situation in
which "the police have probable cause to believe a particular individual committed armed
robbery of a bank" but "lack probable cause to believe that the individual's automobile
contains contraband or the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the armed robbery or any
other crime, although (for whatever reason) it is 'reasonable for [them] to believe' that the
suspect's automobile 'might' contain evidence of the bank robbery" and arguing that Justice
Scalia's approach expands the authority of the police by allowing them to search the car on
suspicion less than probable cause by simply arresting the suspect in close proximity to the
automobile, something they would not be permitted to do under current law).
179. Dripps, supa note 5, at 406-07.
180. See id. at 392.
181. Thornton, 541 U.S. at632 (Scalia, J., concurring).

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:77

for minor traffic offenses (the Atwater leg) are less attractive to
officers because they do not provide automatic justification to search
the car. Most importantly, if the officer arrests for a minor traffic
offense, and develops suspicion amounting to less than probable cause
that narcotics may be in the car, she still cannot search. Justice Scalia
would authorize a search only where it was "reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle."'8 2 The officer needs probable cause to arrest for a drug
offense to trigger the right to search the car based on a reason to
believe less than probable cause. Pretextual stops (the W1hren leg) are
similarly less attractive. They may still occur because the officer
executing a stop for a traffic violation motivated by a hunch relating to
a drug offense may feel confident of discovering facts during the
traffic stop that provide probable cause to arrest for a narcotics offense
and make it reasonable to believe that evidence related to the arrest
offense can be found in the car.' 3 But the officer's hunch must be
correct. If nothing provides suspicion during the traffic stop that rises
to the level of probable cause to justify an arrest for a crime other than
the traffic offense, no search can take place.' 4
Under existing law, the officer may execute the stop on a hunch
counting on the search incident to the arrest for the minor traffic
offense to turn up the evidence of the narcotics violation.' 5 Although
Professor Dripps suggests other approaches to the problem of the "Iron
Triangle" may be more effective and more attractive, Justice Scalia's
approach seems effective in addressing the abuses shielded from
review under current law. More importantly, Professor Dripps' "more
attractive" approaches depend on a reinvigoration of the warrant
approach or overruling Atwater, making them unlikely to be
adopted.'86 Even if Justice Scalia's approach is not viewed as the best,
182. Id (emphasis added).
183. Under current law, this "hunch" may be based on nothing more than racial
profiling. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[T]he constitutional basis
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.").
184. No nonconsensualsearch can take place. The pretextual stop may still be utilized
to gain consent. See Maclin, supra note 141, at 131-35 (noting that police officers can
request consent for a search of a vehicle). Some courts have acted under their state
constitutions to eliminate that practice. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W2d 415, 416 (Minn. 2003)
(holding that in Minnesota officers may not seek consent during traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior).
185. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13 (holding that the motive for a stop is irrelevant and
any resulting searches or arrests would be valid).
186. Dripps, supa note 5, at 407 (recognizing that an approach prohibiting arrests for
minor offenses is "if you pardon the pun, Atwater under the bridge").
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it may be the best we can hope for, and a more attractive choice than
Professor Dripps suggests.
Professor Dripps is not alone in his rejection of Justice Scalia's
approach based on concern about authorizing searches on less than
probable cause. Professor David Rudstein, another commentator who
concedes Justice Scalia's proposed rule is "certainly 'built on firmer
ground,"' identifies the rule's most serious flaw as allowing the police
to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and its contents on
less than probable cause.'87 He views the probable cause standard as
the means to safeguard citizens from "'rash and unreasonable
and he argues Justice Scalia's "less-thaninterferences with privacy,
probable-cause standard" does not adequately protect citizens'
legitimate expectation of privacy in their automobiles and containers
transported in those automobiles.'89 He argues "there is no valid reason
to eliminate the requirement of probable cause merely because the
police arrested the driver or passenger of the vehicle.""'9
This argument understates the magnitude of the triggering event
required by Justice Scalia's approach. Unlike an arrest for a mere
traffic violation that currently triggers authority for a Belton search,
the authority to search on less than probable cause under Justice
Scalia's approach is triggered only if the officer has probable cause to
believe the individual is involved in criminal activity. An arrest for a
traffic offense provides no authority to search the vehicle or containers
on less than probable cause because no evidence of the offense for
which the citizen was arrested will exist in the car or the containers. '
Only if the arrest is for a more serious offense for which there might be
evidence in the vehicle or the containers, and the officer can articulate
why it is reasonable to believe such evidence will be found there, may
the officer search.
In fact, as Professor Rudstein recognizes, in many cases the facts
making it reasonable to believe evidence will be found in the car or
containers will amount to probable cause.'92 He concedes that "[i]n
many cases, the same probable cause supporting the arrest of an
occupant or recent occupant of an automobile will provide probable
187. Rudstein, supranote 81, at 1343-45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id.(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
189. Id at 1345-46.
at 1346.
190. Id.
191. An exception may be an arrest for driving under the influence, for which
evidence may exist in the car, but driving under the influence is more serious than a typical,
minor traffic offense.
192. Rudstein, supra note 81, at 1346-47.
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cause to search the arrestee's vehicle and containers therein""' 3 Thus, it
is a very limited number of cases in which Justice Scalia's approach
grants officers broader authority than a rule based on probable cause,
adding credibility to Justice Scalia's assertion that it makes sense to
grant such authority because the fact of the arrest (for a crime, not a
traffic offense) distinguishes the individual from society at large and
distinguishes the search from "general rummaging." 94 Most
importantly, of course, it protects against the arbitrary, suspicionless
searches that currently take place following arrests for minor traffic
violations.
An additional concern of Professor Rudstein is that Justice
Scalia's proposed rule would conflict with the Chimel rule governing
the search of a home or office incident to the arrest of an individual. 95'
That concern seems hard to justify. There is nothing new in the idea
that searches in a home are treated differently than searches outside the
home, particularly when vehicles are involved.'96 Professor Rudstein's
true concern seems to be possible confusion about when to apply the
Chime1 rule or when to apply Justice Scalia's new rule in situations
outside the home.'97 He asserts that Justice Scalia apparently would
limit searches under his rule to the passenger compartment and
containers in the passenger compartment but complains that Justice
Scalia's rationale seems to apply with equal force to the trunk. 98' The
answer to that concern is that Justice Scalia's rationale and his rule
likely do apply to the trunk; Justice Scalia likely would not limit the
search to the passenger compartment as Professor Rudstein suggests.9

193. Id.at 1347. Professor Maclin has suggested there is no real difference between
probable cause and reason to believe. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of
Locomotion: The FourthAmendment on the Streets,75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1332 (1990)
(noting that various "scholars of diverse viewpoints agree that the probable cause test is now
the functional equivalent of a reason to suspect").
194. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). This
is consistent with the rationale the Court has utilized in recent cases. Cf Samson v.
California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2197-99 (2006) (noting that a parolee or probationer does not
enjoy the same legitimate expectation of privacy as the rest of society because of his status in
the continuum of possible punishments after an arrest).
195. Rudstein, supranote 81, at 1343--44.
196. See id.
at 1310-11.
197. Id.at 1344.
198. Id.
199. Professor Rudstein concedes that Justice Scalia "did not expressly state this
limitation of his proposed rule' but bases his conclusion on the fact that Justice Scalia
several times in his opinion referred to the searches in question as "Belton searches." Id.at
1344 n.294. But Justice Scalia intended to redefine the rationale and the scope of Belton
searches and did not intend to retain the artificial bright line drawn in that case. His
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The point of Justice Scalia's new rule is that it is based on an evidencegathering function, not the safety and destruction of evidence rationale
dependent on accessibility to the arrestee that motivated the Court to
draw a line at the trunk in Belton. That focus eliminates any basis for a
line at the trunk and eliminates the possible confusion Professor
Rudstein identifies.
Professor Rudstein also asserts that Justice Scalia would limit his
rule "to situations in which the arrestee was an occupant or recent
occupant of the vehicle,' and questions "why should that same rule not
also apply when the police arrest an individual inside his home and his
car is parked on the driveway next to his front door, or when the police
arrest an individual while he is walking towards his car and is in close
proximity to it?"2
Although Justice Scalia did seem to be limiting his rule as
Professor Rudstein suggests-he referred to "motorists" being arrested
and to "Beltol' searches-it makes sense under Justice Scalia's
approach to distinguish the situation Professor Rudstein points to and
require that the automobile be in some way related to or involved in the
arrest (the arrest occurred when the arrestee was an occupant or recent
occupant) in order for it to qualify under the search incident to arrest
exception."' Because Justice Scalia relies on the arrest to distinguish
the arrestee from society at large and distinguishes the search from
general rummaging, a relationship between the arrest-not simply the
arrestee-and the car seems essential to invoking the exception to
justify a search of the car."' An automobile that just happens to be
owned by the arrestee should require some other basis to justify a
search. Justice Scalia's suggestion that the temporal and geographic
proximity of the arrestee to the vehicle were relevant to the authority to
references to Belton searches likely were meant to refer generally to searches of automobiles
incident to arrest, the scope of which he intended to redefine.
200. Id at 1344.
201. Of course, under current law, the situations are treated differently presumably
because the passenger compartment is within the lunging area only of occupants and recent
occupants. But once those individuals have been restrained or removed from the scene, that
is no longer true, but the rule nevertheless does not change. According to the petition for
certiorari in Hrasky, lower courts currently are confused whether Thornton requires both a
temporal and spatial proximity to the vehicle or simply a temporal proximity. Hasky
Petition, supra note 81, at 9. There is a split of authority regarding the need for the suspect to
be close enough to the vehicle at the time of arrest to have a realistic chance of accessing it.
Some courts have abandoned any realistic requirement of spatial proximity. See id.at 9-12
(citing as one example Black v. State, 810 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. 2004) (noting that the "suspect
had exited his vehicle, entered an auto shop, and requested an oil change before police
arrived on the scene and arrested him")).
202. SeeThomton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring).

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:77

search supports the idea that a vehicle unrelated to the arrest process
simply would not qualify to be searched under the exception. 3
B.

The New SearchIncident to ArrestException UnderJustce
ScaliaITThornton Approach

Contrary to the picture of a confused search and seizure
jurisprudence painted by some commentators, Justice Scalia's
approach provides the basis for a logical and consistent set of rules,
grounded in the concerns underlying the Fourth Amendment, that
prevents 'rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy' and is
easily understood and complied with by police officers." Most
importantly, and seemingly overlooked by commentators who reject
Justice Scalia's approach, is a recognition that "conducting a Chime!
search is not the Government's right; it is an exception-justified by
necessity."2 5
While the authority to search the person upon arrest remains
unquestioned, any search beyond the person to prevent destruction of
evidence or obtaining a weapon depends on such a search being
necessary. Under this approach, if the suspect is removed from the
scene or restrained in a way that makes such conduct impossible, a
search cannot take place. In addition, any search beyond the wingspan
is governed by three basic principles. First, searches for evidence
generally must "follow the suspicion"-that is, they must be justified
by suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity and
evidence will be found in the particular place searched.0 6 Second,
searches in the home require greater justification than those outside the
home.0 7 And third, searches to protect officer's safety are more readily
justified, but must be limited to efforts to protect the officer and others
from a nonabsurd danger. '
M

203. Seeid at632.
204. Rudstein, supr note 81, at 1345 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949)).
205. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 624 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (voicing agreement with Justice Scalia's forceful argument that lower courts
"seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to ... arrest ... as a police
entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Ch'me,' and
describing this "erosion" as a "direct consequence of Belton's shaky foundation").
206. Seeid.at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. SeeRudstein, supranote 81,at 1310-11.
208. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625-29 (Scalia, J. concurring).
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Follow the Suspicion

This is not a new principle. 219 Until the explosion of bright-line
rules that authorized suspicionless searches, this proposition would
have been widely accepted and recognized. Even the cases authorizing
suspicionless searches generally require special justification for such
searches.20" The principle that the authority to search follows the
suspicion is the principle Justice White urged in Chime] and should
guide the Court in search incident to arrest cases.2 ' In Chine], Justice
White would have permitted a more extensive search than the
majority."' He suggested that when a lawful arrest occurred in a home,
the likelihood of "confederates," or others who would attack the
officers or destroy evidence, being present created an exigency that
forgave the warrant requirement." 3 In his view, an exigency would
permit the officers already lawfully in the home to search anywhere in
the house where they had probable cause to believe evidence or
contraband would be found.2 4

While Justice White's "follow the suspicion" principle would
have expanded the scope of the search incident to arrest in the home, it
led him to dissent in Belton because "searches of luggage, briefcases,
and other containers in the interior of an auto are authorized in the
absence of any suspicion whatsoever that they contain anything in
which the police have a legitimate interest."215 Although Justice White
required probable cause as the level of suspicion required to justify the
26
expanded search in Chime, he was focused on searches in the home.
Justice Scalia's "reasonable to believe" standard would address Justice
White's concern, shared by Justice Scalia and commentators, about
209. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
210. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 (2006) (holding as valid a
search, regardless of a lack of suspicion, warrant, or probable cause, because of the status of
the suspect (a parolee)).
dissenting).
211. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773-74, 780(1969) (White, J.,
212. Id.
at 773-74.
213. Id.
214. Id.at 774. Although the Court did not adopt his approach, it later did address the
exigency of potential officer-attacking or evidence-destroying confederates whom Justice
White believed often would be present and should forgive the warrant. See Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits a "protective sweep").
The Court's careful, incremental approach to that question (unlike the bright-line rule of
Belton) supports the second principle, that searches in the home require greater justification,
as well as the third principle, that searches to protect officer safety are more readily justified
but must be limited to efforts to alleviate the danger.
dissenting).
215. NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,472 (1981) (White, J.,
216. Chimel,395 U.S. at 773-74 (White, J., dissenting).
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searches authorized "in the absence of any suspicion whatsoever." '
This simple principle-that a search for evidence must be justified by
some level of suspicion that evidence will be found in the place
searched-serves to avoid the arbitrary, suspicionless searches that
have become common under the Belton bright-line rule. And it is not
a difficult concept for officers to understand and apply. It is the rule
that already governs their conduct in situations other than the brightline rule exception of Belton.
2.

Searches in the Home Require Greater Justification

This principle is a long-standing one on which the Court
increasingly has relied in recent years.1 8 This overriding principle
justifies different treatment of searches in a home incident to an arrest
and searches of a vehicle incident to arrest. Different treatment does
not mean there is a conflict or that confusion would be generated." 9
The same principle applies in both situations: a search for evidence
incident to arrest beyond the person and the area within the immediate
control must be justified by suspicion that evidence will be discovered
in the place searched.2 ° The suspicion required, not surprisingly, is
greater in the home.' In fact, the greater protection afforded the home
requires not only suspicion at the level of probable cause, but also a
warrant.22 Such a requirement is logical even under the reasonableness approach. Justice White, an advocate of the reasonableness
approach, recognized that reasonableness sometimes required a
warrant, and that searches of the home were one of those times.223
Justice Scalia's approach, by recognizing that a search (other than for
protection of the officer) beyond the person and the area within the
immediate control is really an "evidence-gathering" search, signals to

217. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Belton, 453 U.S. at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
218. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
219. The current state of the law has different rules governing these different
situations. Belton governs searches involving occupants and recent occupants of vehicles,
while Buie, governs searches in the home.
220. See Chime], 395 U.S. at 762-64 (discussing the limits to a search incident to
arrest in the home and in a vehicle).
221. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (noting the reduced
practicality of a warrant to search a car compared to a house because of its ready mobility).
222. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (noting that searches of the
home are "generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on probable cause").
223. Id.
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officers that they need to justify such a search as they would any other
search for evidence.
It is basic search and seizure law that a home search generally
requires a warrant and probable cause-an easily understood concept
for officers. " Officers are not likely to be confused or surprised to
learn that a lesser justification is required outside the home. They are
familiar with the difference between reasonable suspicion that permits
them to stop and frisk and probable cause that permits them to arrest
and to search under Ross and Acevedo."6 Learning and remembering
that in the limited context of a search incident to arrest of an occupant
or recent occupant of a vehicle that they are permitted to search the
vehicle for evidence based on reasonable suspicion should not be
difficult; arguably it is easier than remembering the artificial brightline of Belton that (for reasons that may not be present in the particular
case) the police officers can search an automobile and containers
inside following an arrest, but they cannot enter the trunk.227 And with
the bright line removed from the officers' options, if they err, they are
likely to err by thinking they need probable cause in this situation as
they do in other auto situations, those governed by Ross and Acevedo.
Such a mistake does not result in an unjustified invasion of privacy
because the officers will refrain from searching, which should please
those advocating for greater protection for citizens. The officers'
mistaken belief does deprive society of evidence (if the suspicion is
correct), but society's interest was relatively weak-the officer did not
even have probable cause to believe the evidence was in the vehicle.

224. United States v. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
"Evidence gathering" is referenced in the sense of looking for evidence to incriminate the
individual, not seeking to protect evidence from destruction, one of the underlying rationales
justifying the search of the arrestee and the area within the immediate control. See id.
225. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981).
226. See Dripps, supm note 5, at 404-05 (recognizing, although not finding
satisfactory, that adopting the Terry reasonable suspicion standard would provide police with
a "familiar toolkit" and would add determinancy to the Court's jurisprudence in this area).
227. See Alschuler, supa note 6, at 231 ("[T]he task of marking the boundary of even
a bright line rule usually is not mechanical; and when the rule is artificial, delimiting its
boundary becomes a matter of guesswork."); id at 234 ("[T]o require that officers master and
apply a multiplicity of artificial rules may demand more than they should be expected to
provide. A rule of reason that takes an officer's unhappy lot as its starting point may be fairer,
not only from the perspective of the sound administration of public justice, but also from the
at 287 ("What renders substantive fourth amendment
perspective of the officer himself."); id.
law incomprehensible.., is not the lack of categorical rules but too many of them.... Only a
police officer who studies Professor LaFave's three-volume treatise on evenings and weekends can master the epicycles.").
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One danger of adopting Justice Scalia's approach in Thornton is
that he will not draw the distinction suggested here between the home
and a vehicle and in future cases will permit expanded searches of the
home. This possibility is suggested by Justice Scalia's reliance on
United States v Rabinowftz to justify the "evidence-gathering" search
he advocated should be authorized in Thornton.28 As Justice Scalia

explained, the Court in Rabinowitz upheld a search of the arrestee's
business without restricting the authority to search to the lunging area
of the arrestee and "did not justify the search as a means to prevent
concealment or destruction of evidence.

'229

Instead, the Court "relied

on a more general interest in gathering evidence relevant to the crime
for which the suspect had been arrested." 211 Justice Scalia also cited a

familiar series of cases upholding similar searches in homes.23 ' But
Justice Scalia also noted that the narrower rule of Chime] "also has
historical support."23

He characterized the Rabinowitz rule, if

extended to its logical end, as "hard to reconcile with the influential
case of Entick v Carrngton" and concluded that although "both
Rabinowftz and Chimel are plausible accounts of what the
Constitution requires, ...

neither is so persuasive as to justify

departing from settled law."233 Moreover, while he argued that an
honest assessment of the searches permitted under Belton would
recognize them as "a return to the broader sort of search incident to
arrest that we allowed before Chime," he was careful to add, "limited,
of course, to searches of motor vehicles, a category of 'effects' which
give rise to a reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law
enforcement needs.'
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that Justice
Scalia does not view his new approach as opening the door to
expanded searches of homes incident to arrest. It seems likely he
would find it logical to draw a distinction and provide greater
protection in the home. That approach has been a consistent theme of
his opinions in Fourth Amendment cases. 35'

228. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id
232. Id.at 630.
233. Id.
at 631.
234. Id.(citations omitted).
235. See, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that police may
not use sense-enhancing technology to gather any information about the inside of a home that
could not have been gained without a physical intrusion into the home without a warrant).
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Rather than leading to expanded searches incident to arrest in the
home, application of Justice Scalia's analysis in Thornton may result in
new limits on such searches. If Justice Scalia's apparent rejection in
Thornton of the "now or earlier" rationale is adopted and applied to
homes, a number of searches that currently take place under the
exception would be eliminated.236 At present, as with vehicle searches,
many searches in the home of the lunging area take place after the
suspect has been restrained or removed. If Justice Scalia is consistent,
these searches would no longer be reasonable.
3.

Searches to Protect Officer Safety are More Readily Justified but
Limited to Efforts To Eliminate Danger

Justice Scalia rejected the notion that suspects handcuffed in the
back of squad cars pose a risk of escaping and recovering a weapon
from their vehicle sufficient to justify a bright-line rule.237 Although
the danger likely exists before the suspect is confined, Justice Scalia
suggested conducting a search prior to confinement in order to
"manufacture authority to search" likely was also unreasonable. 38
Without a bright-line rule, any search of the vehicle incident to arrest
for safety reasons requires articulation of the danger that justifies the
search. This is consistent with the rules for search incident to arrest in
the home.
Searches incident to arrest in the home are limited to the person
of the arrestee and the area within his immediate control-there is no
bright line extending the search beyond the immediate area of the
arrest as there is in vehicle cases under Belton." To address possible
danger (attacks by confederates of the arrestee) to officers effecting
arrests in homes, the Court in Maryland v Buie permitted a cursory
236. Justice Scalia's belief that homes deserve greater protection certainly suggests
that there would be no reason not to apply this rationale to the home. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 40 (evidencing Justice Scalia's solicitousness towards the home). In addition, in
addressing the possibility that the search in Thornton might be justified by danger to the
officer of the suspect escaping the back of the squad car and retrieving a weapon from the
car, he analogized it to the danger of an arrestee in a home escaping and recovering a weapon
in the next room, which would not justify a search of additional rooms under Chimel,
suggesting that he believes the same general principles apply to the search incident to arrest
doctrine in each situation. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
237. Id.at 625-26.
238. Id.at 627.
239. CompareChimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that there is no
justification for searching any room, area, or items outside of the arrestee's immediate control
without a warrant), with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) (adopting the
bright-line rule that the entire area within the passenger compartment may be searched
incident to arrest).
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inspection on reasonable suspicion of areas from which such
confederates might be hiding. ' The same approach likely would
apply to searches incident to arrest of occupants and recent occupants
of a vehicle where circumstances (e.g., passengers present who are not
being arrested) provide reasonable fear that a weapon may be in the
vehicle and used against the officer. Current law, Michigan v Long,
already provides for just such a scenario; it permits police to conduct
an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as
long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief
that the suspect is potentially dangerous.24 ' If the suspect has been
confined to the back of a squad car, but his passengers have not been
arrested, surely the principle of Long permits a limited search to
uncover weapons.24 The Court in Buie pointed to Long as support for
the search for safety it was permitting in the home incident to an
arrest.
V

243

CONCLUSION

The approach to searches incident to arrest in situations involving
vehicles suggested by Justice Scalia in Thornton offers relief from the
"Iron Triangle" that currently permits suspicionless searches of
citizens and their vehicles at the unconstrained discretion of individual
officers in the field, often justified by pretextual reasons that hide
improper motives. His suggested approach offers the added benefit of
providing a rationale that may appeal to the conservative Court that
will be deciding these cases in the years to come. Early commentary
on Thornton, however, demonstrates reluctance to embrace Justice
Scalia's approach because it authorizes searches of vehicles on less
than probable cause. But the new power to search on less than probable
cause is a minor expansion of the current authority of officers, and the
gain in relief from the "Iron Triangle's" arbitrary search regime seems
worth the price.
240. 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). Buie also provides an "automatic" right to cursorily
inspect closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
attack could be immediately launched. Id.at 334. No comparable area exists in the case of a
vehicle. Justice Scalia in his opinion in Thornton equated the vehicle to an adjoining room in
the search incident to arrest in a home situation. See 541 U.S. at 629-30 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). If that analogy is accurate, the rules governing searches for safety reasons are
consistent in case of an arrest in a home and an arrest of an occupant or recent occupant of a
vehicle.
241. 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983).
242. See id
243. Buie,494 U.S. at 327.
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Commentators also resist Justice Scalia's approach because it
utilizes the reasonableness approach, which they fear cannot be
contained and will lead to an overbroad authority to search. But the
alternative, the warrant approach, has not proved effective in
preventing a broad expansion of search authority. Whether this is
because the Court has abandoned it, because the warrant requirement
has become so riddled with exceptions as to be ineffective, or because
the Court is willing to utilize bright-line rules to uphold searches that
cannot be justified by the rationales supporting the exception being
utilized, the point is that the time is ripe for a new approach. Those
who believe the language and history of the Fourth Amendment
demand the warrant approach may attack this proposal to embrace the
reasonableness approach as sacrificing principle for pragmatism. I
prefer to stand on the principle that the Fourth Amendment should at a
minimum provide citizens with protection from arbitrary, suspicionless
searches, something it is not accomplishing at present. Justice Scalia's
approach offers the possibility of legitimate protection from such
searches. It is time to stop "spitting into the wind" that has been
blowing against the warrant approach for decades and take advantage
of a shift in the wind by seeking and advocating for a reasonableness
approach that provides citizens the Fourth Amendment protection they
deserve.
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